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INTEGRATED NONMARITAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
E. Gary Spitko*

ABSTRACT
Nonmarital cohabitation has become a mainstream family structure in
the United States. Yet despite the increasing prevalence of nonmarital cohabitants, American family property law generally fails to support
nonmarital couples. This inequality under the law disproportionately disadvantages persons of color, those with relatively less education, and
couples with relatively fewer economic resources. This Article considers the
post-Obergefell need for law reform to better support nonmarital families,
examines the principles that should ground nonmarital property rights reform, and proposes a novel approach to nonmarital property rights that
integrates the law of dissolution with the law of succession, unifies the law
governing nonmarital property rights with the law of marital property
rights, and better serves not only the relatively privileged but also the relatively disadvantaged.
This Article proposes an integrated “accrual adaptor” to structure
nonmarital property rights at dissolution and at death. The adaptor would
be applied to a jurisdiction’s existing marital property law to translate a
marital property right into a nonmarital property right. Thus, the proposal
would not require an adopting jurisdiction to create any novel property law
structures for the nonmarital context and would be fully compatible with
the substantive principles and process norms that ground the adopting jurisdiction’s existing marital property law doctrines.
The accrual feature of this Article’s proposal would work to increase
nonmarital property rights as the duration of the cohabitation at issue increases. This feature is premised on the notion that unmarried committed
partners who have cohabited for a relatively longer period of time are more
likely to have made commitments and engaged in caretaking behaviors that
nonmarital property law reform should encourage. Thus, the relatively
greater nonmarital property award that the proposal would assign to a cohabitation of relatively greater duration reflects the increasing trust that
* Presidential Professor of Ethics and the Common Good and Professor of Law,
Santa Clara University School of Law. The author is grateful to Thomas P. Gallanis, Kerry
L. Macintosh, participants at the 2019 Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor
College of Law Roundtable on Nonmarriage, and participants at the 2019 American College of Trust and Estate Counsel Annual Conference for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this Article.
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third parties develop in the propensity of the cohabitation to meet the
couple’s dependency needs as the relationship endures.
The proposed reform would provide nonmarital partners with lesser
property rights as contrasted with marital partners in similar circumstances.
This differential treatment is likely to make nonmarital property law reform more politically feasible in the short term. Moreover, such differential
treatment can be justified in light of the greater commitment to mutual
caregiving that marriage signifies in comparison to nonmarital
cohabitation.
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I. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

F

OR more than half a century, marriage rates in the United States
have been steadily declining.1 Conversely, in the last several decades, cohabitation rates have increased across all adult age

1. See, e.g., Provisional Number of Marriages and Marriage Rate: United States, 20002019, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 1 (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
data/dvs/national-marriage-divorce-rates-00-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/EY4E-4WKX] (reporting a decline in marriage rate from 8.2 per 1,000 total population in 2000 to 6.1 per
1,000 total population in 2019); JULIANA HOROWITZ, NIKKI GRAF & GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON, PEW RSRCH. CTR., MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN THE U.S. 14 (2019), https://
www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2019/11/
PSDT_11.06.19_marriage_cohabitation_FULL.final_.pdf [https://perma.cc/2A6A-USK4]
(reporting that the percentage of U.S. adults who are married fell from 58% in 1995 to
53% in 2019); Lawrence W. Waggoner, With Marriage on the Decline and Cohabitation on
the Rise, What About Marital Rights for Unmarried Partners?, 41 AM. COLL. TR. & EST.
COUNS. L.J., 49, 51–53 (2015) (discussing evidence of the decline of marriage rates between
1967 and 2012).
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groups.2 Nonmarital cohabitation has now become a mainstream family
structure in the United States.3 In 2019, the Pew Research Center reported that 7% of Americans were cohabiting.4 Cohabitation rates
should be expected to continue to rise for the foreseeable future as
younger cohorts with relatively more favorable attitudes toward cohabitation replace older cohorts that are relatively less accepting of
cohabitation.5
This Article is concerned primarily with property rights for unmarried
cohabitants, especially regarding marital property rights.6 Federal and
state laws provide marital partners with a vast array of legal protections,
entitlements, monetary benefits, and property rights.7 Significant marital
property rights include, for example: community property rights in the
nine states that follow community property principles; the right to seek
spousal maintenance and an equitable division of marital property at
fracture of the relationship; priority for the surviving spouse under every
state’s intestacy scheme; and the right of the surviving spouse to take a
forced share of the decedent spouse’s estate in all but one of the separate
property states.8
A significant minority of states offer nonmarital couples the option of
registering as civil union partners, domestic partners, or designated beneficiaries.9 These licensing regimes afford registrants comprehensive state
2. See, e.g., HOROWITZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 15 (reporting in 2019 that “cohabitation rates have increased across all age groups since 1995”).
3. See, e.g., Waggoner, supra note 1, at 55–56 (discussing evidence of the increase in
cohabitation rates principally between 2000 and 2010).
4. HOROWITZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 4–5.
5. Susan L. Brown & Matthew R. Wright, Older Adults’ Attitudes Toward Cohabitation: Two Decades of Change, 71 J. GEREONTOLOGY: SOC. SCIS. 755, 759–63 (2016) (reporting the results of their study evidencing that growing support for cohabitation among
older adults is driven principally by cohort replacement rather than intracohort change of
attitudes and concluding that “[t]his growth [in acceptance of cohabitation among older
adults] coupled with an increasing share of unmarried adults portends rising levels of later
life cohabitation in the coming years”).
6. Despite this primary focus, the Article’s principal proposed legal reform may have
application not only to nonmarital property rights but also to the provision to nonmarital
cohabitants of a variety of additional federal and state legal protections and entitlements,
such as family medical leave rights and monetary benefits, such as social security benefits.
7. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 658–59 (7th Cir. 2014) (listing many of the “tangible” benefits of marriage under Indiana, Wisconsin, and federal law); Goodridge v. Dep’t.
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955–56 (Mass. 2003) (noting that “[t]he benefits accessible
only by way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every aspect of life and
death” and setting forth a non-comprehensive list of dozens of such rights); Gregg Strauss,
Why the State Cannot “Abolish Marriage”: A Partial Defense of Legal Marriage, 90 IND.
L.J. 1261, 1268–73 (2015) (discussing several categories of legal benefits arising from marital status).
8. Strauss, supra note 7, at 1268–73 (discussing principles of equitable distribution
and spousal maintenance); ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS,
AND ESTATES 72–73, 520–28, 553–55 (10th ed. 2017) (discussing principles of community
property in Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin; the surviving spouse’s privileged status under state intestacy statutes;
and the surviving spouse’s forced share in all of the separate property states except for
Georgia).
9. See generally NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RTS., MARRIAGE, DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS, AND CIVIL UNIONS: SAME-SEX COUPLES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 5–23 (2020),
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property rights.10 For example, California law affords to domestic partners all of the state rights that it affords to marital partners.11 Importantly, California also imposes on domestic partners “the same
responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law” that it imposes upon
marital spouses.12 This type of domestic partnership is, quite simply, marriage identified by a modern alternative label.13
Despite the increasing prevalence of nonmarital cohabitants, American
family property law generally fails to support unlicensed nonmarital
couples.14 For example, the Uniform Probate Code, which comprehensively addresses probate and non-probate transfers of property at death,
fails to even acknowledge the existence of nonmarital couples.15 Indeed,
no state treats a surviving unlicensed nonmarital cohabitant as an heir of
the decedent partner under its intestacy statute or affords them the right
to claim a forced share of the decedent partner’s estate under its elective
share statute.16
https://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Relationship-Recognition.pdf
[https://perma.cc/35LR-MEVE] (listing nine states and the District of Columbia that offer
nonmarital partners the option of registering their relationship).
10. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-15-107(1) (West 2021) (“A party to a civil
union has the rights, benefits, protections, duties, obligations, responsibilities, and other
incidents under law as are granted to or imposed upon spouses . . . .”); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 106.340 (West 2021) (extending the privileges and obligations of marriage to domestic partners).
11. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2021) (“Registered domestic partners shall have
the same rights, protections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the same responsibilities,
obligations, and duties under law, whether they derive from statutes, administrative regulations, court rules, government policies, common law, or any other provisions or sources of
law, as are granted to and imposed upon spouses.”).
12. Id.
13. See Dwight G. Duncan, The Federal Marriage Amendment and Rule by Judges, 27
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 543, 550 (2004) (describing civil unions as “marriage-in-all-butname”).
14. See, e.g., Danaya Wright & Beth Sterner, Honoring Probable Intent in Intestacy:
An Empirical Assessment of the Default Rules and the Modern Family, 42 AM. COLL. TR. &
EST. COUNS. L.J. 341, 369 (2017) (“The more people in non-traditional family structures
must rely on intestacy for passing wealth to their loved ones, the less likely the fit will be
equitable, as the intestacy laws rely heavily on marriage and biological relationships for
inheritance rights.”); Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for
Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 178 (2015) (discussing ways in which the law
fails to protect nonmarital couples).
15. See Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti, A Critical Research Agenda for
Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 49 REAL PROP., TR. & EST. L.J. 317, 338 (2014) (citing UNIF.
PROB. CODE §§ 2-101 to 105 (amended 2010)) (“Thus, as currently drafted, the [Uniform
Probate Code] continues not only to reflect but also to further entrench the privileging of
marriage, attempting to skew and direct choices regarding family formation rather than
leaving it to the affected individuals to choose the family form that best suits them.”); E.
Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital
Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063, 1104 (1999) (noting that Article II of the Uniform Probate Code “not only fails to provide intestate inheritance rights for same-sex committed
partners, but also contains no indication in its two hundred-plus pages of provisions and
commentary that gay men, lesbians, or the families of either exist”).
16. For an example of a court holding that no equitable remedies exist to overcome
this treatment, see In re Estate of Alexander, 445 So. 2d 836, 840 (Miss. 1984) (holding that
no equitable remedy was available to a surviving nonmarital cohabitant who had lived with
the decedent for thirty-three years and who sought an equitable lien granting her a life
estate in the residence that she had shared with the decedent). A New Hampshire statute
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State law governing the property rights of unlicensed nonmarital cohabitants during the joint lives of the partners is far more complicated
and varied.17 At one extreme, Illinois case law is utterly hostile to
nonmarital property rights.18 The state rejects any “mutually enforceable
property rights” arising from a nonmarital relationship, regardless of
whether the claim is grounded in express contract, implied contract, or
equity.19 Thus, to prevail on a claim under Illinois law against one’s
nonmarital partner, one must demonstrate that the claim has an economic basis independent of the nonmarital cohabitation.20 Illinois’s public policies in favor of marriage and against common law marriage
undergird this hostility to the recognition of property rights arising from
cohabitation.21
At the far opposite end of the spectrum from Illinois, Washington state
case law provides for equitable distribution of property acquired during
certain nonmarital cohabitations.22 To qualify for equitable distribution, a
nonmarital cohabitant must first demonstrate that both partners enjoyed
a “meretricious relationship,” which Washington case law defines as a
“stable, marital-like relationship where both parties cohabit with the
knowledge that a lawful marriage between them does not exist.”23 Washington courts apply a non-exhaustive, five-factor test to analyze whether a
meretricious relationship existed: “continuous cohabitation, duration of
the relationship, purpose of the relationship, pooling of resources and
services for mutual benefit, and the intent of the parties.”24 If a court
provides that “persons cohabiting and acknowledging each other as husband and wife, and
generally reputed to be such, for the period of 3 years, and until the death of one of them,
shall thereafter be deemed to have been legally married.” N.H. REV. STAT. § 457:39. Thus,
cohabitants who qualify under the statute are married under New Hampshire law for the
purposes of intestacy and the elective share.
17. See Raymond C. O’Brien, Marital Versus Nonmarital Entitlements, 45 AM. COLL.
TR. & EST. COUNS. L.J. 79, 85–86, 117–24 (2020) (discussing how “state courts and legislatures take a variety of approaches to petitions for redress submitted by one nonmarital
cohabitant against the other”); Strauss, supra note 7, at 1276–83 (surveying state law governing property rights of nonmarital cohabitants).
18. See Blumenthal v. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d 834, 860 (Ill. 2016); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394
N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979). Georgia law arguably falls at the same far end of the spectrum as Illinois law. Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81, 82 (Ga. 1977) (holding that claims
premised upon a nonmarital cohabitation were not enforceable given that such claims were
“founded upon an illegal or immoral consideration”). But see Cates v. Brown, 850 S.E.2d
764, 767 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020) (commenting that “the [Georgia] Supreme Court’s statements
in holding that the fornication statute was unconstitutional bring Rehak’s continued applicability into doubt”).
19. See Blumenthal, 69 N.E.3d at 858, 860; Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1210.
20. See Blumenthal, 69 N.E.3d at 855–56; Spafford v. Coats, 455 N.E.2d 241, 245 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983) (“[W]here the claims [between nonmarital cohabitants] do not arise from
the relationship between the parties and are not rights closely resembling those arising
from conventional marriages, we conclude that the public policy expressed in Hewitt does
not bar judicial recognition of such claims.”).
21. See Blumenthal, 69 N.E.3d at 857–59; Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1207, 1209–11.
22. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 769–770 (Wash. 2000) (en
banc); In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
23. In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d at 770–71; Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d
831, 834 (Wash. 1995) (en banc).
24. In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d at 770 (citing Connell, 898 P.2d at 834).
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finds that a meretricious relationship existed, the court will presume that
all property acquired during the relationship belongs to both partners and
will equitably distribute all property between the partners (if the presumption is not rebutted).25 In equitably distributing the property acquired during the meretricious relationship, the court, for guidance, may
look to Washington’s statute governing the disposition of property upon
dissolution of a marriage.26
In between the extremes of Illinois’s hostility to nonmarital property
rights and Washington’s marriage-like equitable distribution for meretricious relationships, the vast majority of states require a nonmarital cohabitant who seeks to assert a property claim against a partner arising
from their cohabitation to rely upon a variety of contract and equitable
doctrines, such as express contract,27 implied-in-fact contract,28 quantum

25. In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d at 770; Connell, 898 P.2d at 836–37.
26. In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d at 770; Connell, 898 P.2d at 835.
27. See, e.g., Tomal v. Anderson, 426 P.3d 915, 923 (Alaska 2018) (“[A] valid contract
between the [nonmarital cohabitant] parties—express or implied—will control the classification [of property as separate or partnership property] in the first instance.”); Joan S. v.
John S., 427 A.2d 498, 500 (N.H. 1981) (“[A] court will enforce an action in contract [between nonmarital cohabitants], if one can be shown to exist, to the extent that it is not
founded upon the consideration of meretricious sexual relations.”); Morone v. Morone,
413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157–58 (N.Y. 1980) (holding an express cohabitation contract to be enforceable); Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 116 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (holding that a
nonmarital cohabitant had stated a cause of action for breach of an express contract and
basing that holding “on the principle that adults who voluntarily live together and engage
in sexual relations are nonetheless as competent as any other persons to contract respecting their earnings and property rights”).
28. See, e.g., W. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Nev. 1992) (holding that “unmarried cohabiting adults may agree to hold property that they acquire as
though it were community property” and concluding “that there is substantial evidence to
support the district court’s finding that [the cohabitants] impliedly agreed to hold their
property as though they were married”); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 313 (Wis. 1987)
(concluding that a nonmarital cohabitant may bring “a claim for damages resulting from
the [partner]’s breach of an express or an implied in fact contract to share with the [cohabitant] the property accumulated through the efforts of both parties during their relationship”); Cook v. Cook, 691 P.2d 664, 667, 670 (Ariz. 1984) (“Although isolated acts of joint
participation such as cohabitation or the opening of a joint account may not suffice to
create a contract, the fact finder may infer an exchange of promises, and the existence of
the contract, from the entire course of conduct between the parties.”); Marvin, 557 P.2d at
110, 116 (“In the absence of an express contract, the courts should inquire into the conduct
of the [nonmarital cohabitant] parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an
implied contract, agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties.”).
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meruit,29 unjust enrichment,30 constructive trust,31 and equitable adjustment.32 Not all of these states recognize all of these types of claims in the
context of a nonmarital cohabitation. Some states, for example, refuse to
recognize implied cohabitation contracts.33 Moreover, some states impose additional requirements for certain claims by one cohabitant against
another. For example, a few states will not enforce even an express cohabitation contract unless the contract is in writing.34
In light of this jumble of limited state protections for nonmarital cohabitants, how to respond to increasing cohabitation rates and decreasing
marriage rates has been a central issue for U.S. law reform for decades.35
29. See, e.g., Boland v. Catalano, 521 A.2d 142, 146 (Conn. 1987); Marvin, 557 P.2d at
110, 122–23 (“[A] nonmarital partner may recover in quantum meruit for the reasonable
value of household services rendered less the reasonable value of support received if he
can show that he rendered services with the expectation of monetary reward.”).
30. See, e.g., Cates v. Brown, 850 S.E.2d 764, 767–68 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020) (recognizing
a nonmarital cohabitant’s right to bring an unjust enrichment claim); Salzman v. Bachrach,
996 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) (allowing cohabitant’s claim against partner for
unjust enrichment); Cates v. Swain, 215 So.3d 492, 496–97 (Miss. 2013) (holding that a
court may “grant relief to [a cohabitant] based on the theory of unjust enrichment”); Watts,
405 N.W.2d at 313–14 (“Many courts have held, and we now so hold, that unmarried cohabitants may raise claims based upon unjust enrichment following the termination of their
relationships where one of the parties attempts to retain an unreasonable amount of the
property acquired through the efforts of both.”); Turner v. Freed, 792 N.E.2d 947, 950 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2003) (“This Court already has determined that a party who cohabitates with
another person without subsequent marriage is entitled to relief upon a showing of . . . a
viable equitable theory such as . . . unjust enrichment.”).
31. See, e.g., Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 438 (W. Va. 1990) (holding that “a court
may order a division of property acquired by a man and woman who are unmarried cohabitants, but who have considered themselves and held themselves out to be husband and
wife[,]” and that “[s]uch order may be based upon principles of contract, either express or
implied, or upon a constructive trust”); Watts, 405 N.W.2d at 315 (holding “that if the
[cohabitant] can prove the elements of unjust enrichment . . . she will be entitled to demonstrate further that a constructive trust should be imposed as a remedy”); Marvin, 557 P.2d
at 110 (stating that a court considering a claim concerning the distribution of property
acquired during a nonmarital relationship “may also employ . . . equitable remedies such as
constructive or resulting trusts”).
32. See, e.g., In re Mallett, 37 A.3d 333, 338 (N.H. 2012) (noting that “where such
theories are properly raised, unmarried couples living together may be able to obtain equitable adjustment of their rights”).
33. See, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157–58 (N.Y. 1980) (“Finding an
implied contract such as was recognized in Marvin v. Marvin . . . to be conceptually so
amorphous as practically to defy equitable enforcement” and declining to recognize an
implied cohabitation agreement (citation omitted)).
34. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.075 (West 2021) (cohabitation agreement governing property and financial relations must be in writing and signed by the parties); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 25:1–5(h) (“A promise by one party to a non-marital personal relationship to
provide support or other consideration for the other party, either during the course of such
relationship or after its termination” is not binding unless in writing); TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 26.01(a)(1)-(2), (b)(3) (West 2021) (“[A]n agreement made on consideration
of . . . nonmarital conjugal cohabitation” is not enforceable unless it is “in writing” and
“signed by the person to be charged with the promise”); Kohler v. Flynn, 493 N.W.2d 647,
649 (N.D. 1992) (“If live-in companions intend to share property, they should express that
intention in writing.”).
35. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 14, at 174 (“The shift toward the nonmarital family is the most important challenge facing family law today, and it is essential to think
critically about how to occupy the legal space left open by the retreat of marriage.”);
Thomas P. Gallanis, The Flexible Family in Three Dimensions, 28 LAW & INEQ. 291, 291
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Early on, this nonmarital property law reform movement intersected with
the LGBT Civil Rights Movement.36 Widespread calls for law reform to
better support nonmarital partners began long before any U.S. state recognized the right of a same-sex couple to marry and long before marriage
equality seemed feasible.37 For example, beginning in the early 1980s, gay
and lesbian rights activists lobbied municipalities to create domestic partnership registries and to recognize limited but significant rights, such as
hospital visitation privileges for registrants.38
Marriage inequality added urgency to these nonmarital law reform efforts.39 The exclusion of same-sex couples from state-sanctioned marriage
and its considerable rights and protections exposed same-sex couples to
the risk of significant financial and emotional burdens.40 Thus, marriage
inequality caused the extension of rights to nonmarital couples to be seen
as a gay civil rights priority.41 At the same time, intense hostility to any
legal recognition for gay relationships imposed an additional obstacle for
nonmarriage law reform efforts.42
(2010) (“One of the central questions facing American family law throughout the last quarter century, and continuing today, is how to respond to the ‘extraordinary growth in the
rate of nonmarital cohabitation.’”); E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to
Intestate Inheritance Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners, 81 OR. L. REV. 255, 255–56
(2002) (identifying the need to “better serve non-marital families while at the same time
maintaining a reasonable ease of administration of estates” as “a most pressing challenge
facing inheritance law scholars”).
36. See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104
CALIF. L. REV. 1207, 1240 (2016) (“[T]he earliest [domestic partnership] regimes were
broadly associated with efforts to secure rights for same-sex couples.”); Grace Ganz
Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and Responsibilities in
the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1268–69 (2001) (“[S]ame-sex
couples have been the dominant force in the movement to regularize nonmarital
cohabitation.”).
37. See Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital
Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 91 (2014) (arguing
that “before Baehr [v. Lewin] and the marriage advocacy that would follow[,] marriage
shaped nonmarital recognition and, conversely, nonmarital recognition shaped marriage”);
see also NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE 49 (2008); Murray, supra note 36, at 1250.
38. Strauss, supra note 7, at 1276 (“LGBT advocates convinced municipalities to enact
the first [domestic partnership] registries in the 1980s, when state-level recognition was
politically infeasible.”).
39. NeJaime, supra note 37, at 128.
40. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 791–92 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (recounting lesbian partner’s multi-year effort to be allowed to visit with and be
appointed guardian of her partner with whom she had lived for four years prior to her
partner becoming disabled); E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the
Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 275, 281–85 (1999) (explaining how a testator who disinherits her close blood relations in favor of her same-sex romantic partner is at elevated risk
of having a trier of fact discard her estate plan).
41. See generally POLIKOFF, supra note 37, at 46–62; NeJaime, supra note 37, at
104–05, 114.
42. See, e.g., Susan N. Gary, The Probate Definition of Family: A Proposal for Guided
Discretion in Intestacy, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 787, 798 (2012) (attributing the Uniform
Probate Code’s lack of inheritance rights for unmarried partners, in part, to the political
reality that “[r]ecognition of unmarried partners, particularly same-sex partners, was, and
continues to be, controversial throughout the United States”).
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In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,43
holding that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment preclude a state from denying marriage recognition
to same-sex couples,44 the landscape for nonmarital property law reform
has shifted.45 Marriage equality has rendered moot a principal argument
against nonmarital property rights grounded in hostility toward recognition of gay unions: the fear expressed by some that domestic partner benefits would pave the way for same-sex marriage.46
On the other hand, marriage equality removes one compelling social
justice argument in favor of extending legal protections to nonmarital
couples47: failure to extend marital property rights to persons who are
excluded from marriage because of their sexual orientation is a greater
and distinct injustice than denial of property rights to couples who choose
not to exercise their freedom to marry.48 At the same time, marriage
equality allows for a more concentrated focus on the argument that
nonmarital property rights undermine marriage by incentivizing those
who are free to marry to choose not to do so.49
43. 576 U.S. 664 (2015).
44. Id. at 674–75.
45. See, e.g., Albertina Antognini, Against Nonmarital Exceptionalism, 51 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1891, 1930 (2018) (agreeing with scholars who have argued “that now that marriage is available to same-sex couples, claims based on nonmarital relationships will become less viable”); Murray, supra note 36, at 1244 (“In nationalizing marriage equality,
Obergefell may sound the death knell for alternative statuses—and the promise of a more
pluralistic relationship-recognition regime.”).
46. See NeJaime, supra note 37, at 153 (discussing the argument by lawmakers opposed to California’s domestic partnership ordinance “that the domestic partnership law
would both weaken the institution of marriage and pave the way for same-sex marriage”).
47. Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, A Right Not to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1509,
1519 (2016) (“Municipalities and states that created domestic partnerships as a way to create some parity for same-sex couples might no longer see the need to provide those benefits to the unmarried.”). For a discussion of scholarly arguments that Obergefell and other
gay rights decisions “further entrench the supremacy of marriage” and may lead to an
increase in discrimination against the unmarried, see Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights
Canon and the Right to Nonmarriage, 97 B.U. L. REV. 425, 426–28, 440–43 (2017).
48. See Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law
of Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 869–70 (2005); NeJaime, supra note 37, at
116 (noting the argument of an early proponent of domestic partnership ordinances that
“opposite-gender couples may marry if and when they choose. Their temporary, voluntary
exclusion when they do not choose to marry is not equal to [same-sex couples’] permanent,
involuntary, and categorical exclusion.” (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted)); cf. Matsumura, supra note 47, at 1518 (“The arrival of nationwide marriage
equality therefore calls into question [the reasons for various state alternatives to marriage,
such as municipal registries,] for being and leaves their future existence in jeopardy.”).
49. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (Ill. 1979) (“Will the fact that legal
rights closely resembling those arising from conventional marriages can be acquired by
those who deliberately choose to enter into what have heretofore been commonly referred
to as ‘illicit’ or ‘meretricious’ relationships encourage formation of such relationships and
weaken marriage as the foundation of our family-based society?”); id. at 1209 (“We cannot
confidently say that judicial recognition of property rights between unmarried cohabitants
will not make that alternative to marriage more attractive by allowing the parties to engage
in such relations with greater security.”); NeJaime, supra note 37, at 152–53 (discussing
California Governor Gray Davis’s opposition to a domestic partnership that would be
open to different-sex couples on the ground that such couples, unlike same-sex couples,
enjoyed the right to marry and, thus, their inclusion would devalue marriage).
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Yet marriage equality does not obviate the need for law reform to better serve the interests of nonmarital couples.50 As Professors Bridget
Crawford and Anthony Infanti have argued, “Eliminating de jure discrimination against same-sex couples by affording them access to marriage merely adds another group to a privileged circle. . . . [but] does
nothing to eliminate the broader privileges based on marital status and
conformity to the ‘traditional’ family norm of a conjugal couple surrounded by children.”51 Thus, critical issues remain: to what extent
should nonmarital property law extend marital property rights to cohabitants who choose not to marry, and how should the law extend those
rights?
For myriad reasons, millions of nonmarital couples who enjoy the freedom to marry choose not to do so.52 These reasons should inform the
particulars of nonmarital property law reform. Many cohabitants consciously decide not to marry and not to participate in the marital property
law regime in order to maintain their personal and financial autonomy.53
For example, cohabitation may allow a cohabitant to maintain pension or
social security benefits relating to a late or former spouse that would
cease upon remarriage.54 Cohabitation in lieu of marriage may also be
the easiest and surest way for a cohabitant to protect their financial assets
from a partner’s claims, allowing the property owner eventually to pass
their wealth to their descendants from a prior relationship or to other
favored relations.55
For other cohabitants, cohabitation is a trial period that will conclude
relatively quickly either in marriage or with a breakup of the relationship.56 Roughly half of cohabitations end with a marriage or a breakup
50. See, e.g., Gary, supra note 42, at 799 (“[T]he availability of marriage or registration
does not eliminate the need for an intestacy share for unmarried or unregistered partners.”); Deborah A. Widiss, Non-Marital Families and (or After?) Marriage Equality, 42
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 547, 571–72 (2015) (“[M]arriage equality will not end the need to reconsider the extent to which a large number of government policies and programs rely on
marriage as the exclusive mechanism of recognizing family structures.”).
51. Crawford & Infanti, supra note 15, at 338.
52. Waggoner, supra note 1, at 63–64.
53. Brown & Wright, supra note 5, at 756.
54. Beal v. Beal, 577 P.2d 507, 508 n.2 (Or. 1978) (en banc); Marvin v. Marvin, 557
P.2d 106, 117 n.11 (Cal. 1976) (en banc); Brown & Wright, supra note 5, at 756.
55. Brown & Wright, supra note 5, at 756 (noting that cohabitation in lieu of marriage
“helps to protect assets and financial resources from being drained by the partner, facilitating economic transfers across generations”).
56. HOROWITZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 8 (“Most married adults (66%) who lived with
their spouse before they were married (and who were not yet engaged when they moved in
together) say they saw cohabitation as a step toward marriage when they first started living
with their now-spouse. Among cohabiting adults who were not engaged when they moved
in with their partner, 44% say they saw living together as a step toward marriage.”); Waggoner, supra note 1, at 64–65 (“The most important statistic for spousal-rights law is that
for most people cohabitation is a temporary or short-term state. The parties either break
up or get married fairly quickly.”); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to
Status: Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 293, 360 (2015) (“For many couples, cohabitation is experimental, a way for each
cohabitant to evaluate whether the relationship is viable and the other party a trustworthy
and compatible life partner.”); see also Marvin, 557 P.2d at 117 n.11 (noting that some
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within eighteen months.57 Only about 10% of cohabitations last five years
or more.58
Finally, many cohabitants do not marry because of their personal current financial insecurities.59 In a 2019 Pew Research Center survey, 56%
of cohabitants who were not engaged, but would like to marry someday,
stated that their own lack of financial readiness was a reason why they
were not engaged or married to their partner.60 Fifty-three percent of
these respondents listed their partner’s lack of financial readiness as a
reason why they were not engaged or married.61
As this data on financial insecurity suggests, participation in marriage
and, thus, enjoyment of the benefits the state confers on married couples,
differs along lines of class, race, and national origin.62 Asian and white
adult Americans are far more likely to be married than are Hispanic and
Black adult Americans.63 Moreover, marriage rates have a positive correlation with income, education, and wealth.64 In 2018, 77.4% of the highest
U.S. earners were married, almost 49% of those in the middle three-fifths
of earners were married, and only 16.7% of the lowest quintile of U.S.
earners were married.65 Among Americans twenty-five years and older,
those with a bachelor’s degree or more are more likely to be married than
those with only some college experience who, in turn, are more likely to
be married than those with only a high school diploma or less education.66 Married Americans ages twenty-five to thirty-four have four times
the median wealth of nonmarital cohabiting couples in the same age cononmarital cohabitants “live together without marriage. . . . as a possible prelude to
marriage”).
57. Waggoner, supra note 1, at 65.
58. Id.
59. HOROWITZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 9; Janet Adamy & Paul Overberg, Affluent
Americans Still Say ‘I Do.’ More in the Middle Class Don’t. Marriage and All Its Related
Social and Financial Benefits Are Becoming a Luxury Good., WALL ST. J. (Mar. 8, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/affluent-americans-still-say-i-do-its-the-middle-class-thatdoes-not-11583691336?st=3od1p0f9ggn34b3&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink [https://
perma.cc/TM5U-FF9L] (“Middle-class Americans are forsaking marriage amid financial
insecurity, effectively making the institution more of a luxury good enjoyed by prosperous
Americans.”).
60. HOROWITZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 9.
61. Id.
62. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 117 n.11 (Cal. 1976) (“In lower socio-economic groups the difficulty and expense of dissolving a former marriage often leads
couples to choose a nonmarital relationship.”). See generally JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI
CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY
(2014) (exploring the relationships of socioeconomic class, education, and race with family
structures).
63. HOROWITZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 16 (reporting that 63% percent of adult Asian
Americans, 57% percent of adult white Americans, 48% percent of adult Hispanic Americans, and 33% percent of adult Black Americans are married).
64. Id.; Adamy & Overberg, supra note 59.
65. Mark J. Perry, Explaining US Income Inequality by Household Demographics,
2018 Update, AM. ENTER. INST. (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/explaining-us-income-inequality-by-household-demographics-2018-update [https://perma.cc/
4PGZ-NDAZ] (using data from the U.S. Census Bureau).
66. HOROWITZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 16 (reporting that, of Americans ages twentyfive and older, 66% with a bachelor’s degree or more education, 56% of those with only

162

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

hort.67 These data suggest that social justice concerns remain highly relevant to the debate over nonmarital property rights. Indeed, the need for
reform to serve the interests of nonmarital families, to strengthen
nonmarital relationships, and to support the efforts of nonmarital partners to care for one another remains compelling even after Obergefell.68
This Article proposes an “integrated” approach to nonmarital property
rights. Merriam-Webster defines “integrate” as “form[ing], coordinat[ing], or blend[ing] into a functioning or unified whole” and
“unit[ing] with something else.”69 It is in this sense that my reform proposal aims to integrate several realms of law that are too often addressed
separately in the discourse on nonmarital property.
First, my proposal brings together the law of dissolution with the law of
succession. The academic literature is replete with nonmarital property
law reform proposals that focus solely on nonmarital property rights at
the fracture of the relationship during the joint lives of the cohabitants.70
Conversely, numerous reform proposals focus on nonmarital property
rights solely when the relationship ends at death.71 These piecemeal approaches leave nonmarital cohabitants relatively more or less protected
depending upon whether the cohabitation ends with a breakup or at the
death of a partner. Thus, these narrow reforms risk incentivizing cohabitants to end a troubled relationship precipitously or remain in a broken
relationship too long.72 As discussed below, although an approach to
nonmarital property law reform that integrates dissolution law with insome college experience, and 54% with a high school diploma or less education were
married).
67. Adamy & Overberg, supra note 59.
68. See generally Waggoner, supra note 1, at 93 (“If the marriage and cohabitation
trends continue—downward for marriage, upward for cohabitation—or even if the trends
stabilize at the current rates or reverse somewhat . . . , the lack of marital rights for committed partners will persist as a problem until a solution is found.”); Widiss, supra note 50,
at 570 (“Larger demographic trends suggest, however, that if government policies continue
to rely exclusively, or primarily, on marriage as the marker of family interdependence, the
policies will leave out a significant portion of the poorest and most vulnerable same-sex
couples and their children, just as the policies leave out a significant portion of the poorest
and most vulnerable different-sex couples and their children.”).
69. Integrate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
integrate [https://perma.cc/7HUD-PA35].
70. See PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAM. DISSOLUTION §§ 6.01–06 (AM. L. INST. 2002);
Antognini, supra note 45, at 1899; Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a
Pluralist Regulation of Spousal Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1567–69
(2009).
71. My own previous scholarship has discussed at length the need for law reform to
extend intestate inheritance rights to nonmarital couples so as to promote the donative
intent of the decedent nonmarital partner and to protect the reliance and reciprocity interests of the surviving nonmarital partner. See generally Mary Louise Fellows & E. Gary
Spitko, How Should Non-Probate Transfers Matter in Intestacy?, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
2207 (2020); E. Gary Spitko, Intestate Inheritance Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners: Lessons for U.S. Law Reform from the Scottish Experience, 103 IOWA L. REV. 2175
(2018) [hereinafter Spitko, Intestate Inheritance Rights]; Mary Louise Fellows, E. Gary
Spitko & Charles Q. Strohm, An Empirical Assessment of the Potential for Will Substitutes
to Improve State Intestacy Statutes, 85 IND. L.J. 409 (2010); Spitko, supra note 35; Spitko,
supra note 15.
72. See infra Section II.C.2.
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heritance law is not without potential drawbacks, my reform proposal addresses and mitigates them.73
In addition, my proposed reform integrates the law governing
nonmarital property rights with the law of marital property rights. The
proposal is cognizant of the reasons why the law privileges marriage and
of the effect that reform may have on marriage. The structure of my proposed reform reflects these concerns, respectively, in utilizing cohabitation duration to measure the cohabitants’ commitment to their
relationship and to mutual caretaking and in capping nonmarital property
rights at a proper fraction of parallel marital property rights.74
Finally, my proposal would reform nonmarital property law so that it
better serves not only the relatively privileged but also the relatively disadvantaged. As discussed above, marriage rates correlate positively with
income, wealth, and education.75 Thus, nonmarital property law reform
can disproportionately benefit adults with relatively fewer resources. This
potential may be lost, however, if the reform structure requires a sophisticated understanding of legal principles to effectively opt in to nonmarital
property rights given that those with fewer resources are less likely to
have access to legal counsel. My reform proposal ensures that those with
relatively fewer resources still benefit from the reform; the proposal eschews reliance upon contract as a primary means of protecting
nonmarital cohabitants and prioritizes simplicity by piggybacking on the
relevant jurisdiction’s marital property law.76
The remainder of this Article develops and defends a proposal for integrated nonmarital property rights. Part II of this Article discusses in
greater detail the primary principles that ground my nonmarital property
law reform proposal and puts forth a justification for reliance upon these
principles.77 These principles are (1) provision of only lesser rights for
nonmarital cohabitants in comparison to marital partners; (2) compatibility with the values and norms that ground marital property rights; and (3)
utilization of duration as a factor influencing a cohabitant’s eligibility for
any nonmarital property rights and the content of those rights. Part III
details the structure of my reform proposal and explains how the proposed structure furthers the principles that should ground nonmartial
property law reform.78 The proposal’s two most significant features are its
adaptor mechanism and its accrual mechanism. The adaptor mechanism
translates marital property rights into nonmarital property rights by applying a proper fraction to a hypothetical marital property award.79 The
accrual mechanism increases a cohabitant’s nonmarital property rights as
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra Section II.B.
infra Section II.A.
supra notes 62–68.
infra Section III.B.1.
infra Part II.
infra Part III.
infra Section III.B.1.

164

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

the duration of the cohabitation increases.80 Part IV briefly concludes.
II. PRINCIPLES TO GROUND NONMARITAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS
Three main principles comprise the blueprint for my proposed
nonmarital property law reform. Whether a nonmarital partnership
should be considered the equivalent of marriage for property rights purposes is the focus of intense academic debate. Therefore, this Part begins
with a discussion of the nonmarriage equality issue. This Part then discusses the need for nonmarital property law reform to be compatible with
the values and norms that ground marital property law. Finally, this Part
concludes with a discussion of the use and importance of cohabitation
duration or relationship duration to the structure of nonmarital property
law reform.
A. LESSER RIGHTS

FOR

NONMARITAL PARTNERS

A number of scholars have advanced constitutional arguments in favor
of a fundamental right not to marry that would give rise to protections for
nonmarital property rights.81 A strong form of the constitutional argument provides that the state violates the fundamental right to remain unmarried when it favors married persons over unmarried persons with
respect to any determination of rights.82 Thus, Jennifer Jaff has argued
that “there is not even a rational relation between the promotion of family values and differential treatment of married and unmarried people;
and laws and regulations which distinguish between people on the basis
of marital status whether explicitly or in effect, should be struck down.”83
However, Jaff herself conceded at the time she made her argument that
“it would be foolish to expect this argument to meet with the Supreme
Court’s approval.”84 Indeed, to date, the Supreme Court has not held that
the Constitution protects a fundamental “right to nonmarriage.”85
Moreover, Jaff’s argument fails to acknowledge, let alone give sufficient weight to, the state’s interests in favoring marriage so as to encourage familial commitment and promote stability in core family
80. See infra Section III.B.2.
81. See, e.g., Jennifer Jaff, Wedding Bell Blues: The Position of Unmarried People in
American Law, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 207, 208 (1988); Joslin, supra note 47, at 431.
82. Jaff, supra note 81, at 224–25.
83. Id. at 230.
84. Id. at 231.
85. Joslin, supra note 47, at 477 (“To be sure, a majority of the [Supreme] Court has
never expressly embraced a broad right to nonmarriage.”); Serena Mayeri, Marital
Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1277, 1280
(2015) (discussing Supreme Court case law holding that various illegitimacy classifications
violated equal protection and concluding that, in these cases, “[t]he Court found nothing
unconstitutional about . . . promoting traditional marriage”); O’Brien, supra note 17, at 140
(“Currently there are no circumstances indicating that . . . the Court will act to extend
entitlements to nonmarital cohabitants . . . .”); see also Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441
So. 2d 316, 323 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (rejecting arguments in favor of a “constitutionally
protected right against discrimination between wives and concubines”).

2022]

Nonmarital Property Rights

165

relationships.86 The state benefits when marital partners commit to care
for one another until parted by death.87 The state also benefits when the
commitment and stability of marital parents helps the parents’ children to
flourish.88 Professor Clare Huntington has reviewed empirical data evidencing differential outcomes between children who live with married
parents and children who live with cohabiting but unmarried biological
parents.89 She has written of the complex relationship between marriage,
stable parenting units, and the best interests of children:
Children of unmarried parents fare much worse on a variety of metrics than children growing up with married parents. Poverty and factors such as parental education explain much of this differential, but
there is increasing evidence that family structure is an independent
causal factor. The connection between family structure and child outcomes is rooted in developmental psychology, particularly in a
child’s need for strong, stable, positive relationships.90
In addition to its interest in familial commitment and stability, the state
has a practical interest in minimizing the danger of specious and fraudulent claims given the ambiguous nature of many nonmarital relationships.91 This is especially relevant when the claimed nonmarital
partnership ended because of the death of one of the purported partners.
In such cases, the decedent is unavailable to testify as to the nature of the
relationship.92
86. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 961 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (listing the facilitation of “stable households in which the adults who reside there and are
committed to one another by their own consents will support one another as well as their
dependents” as among the reasons that the state licenses and fosters marriage); Norman v.
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 663 P.2d 904, 909 (Cal. 1983) (citing “the state’s legitimate interest in promoting marriage” in rejecting the constitutional claim “that nonmarried persons must be afforded all the rights and benefits extended to married persons”).
87. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 424 (Cal. 2008) (“[T]he legal obligations of
support that are an integral part of marital and family relationships relieve society of the
obligation of caring for individuals who may become incapacitated or who are otherwise
unable to support themselves.”); O’Brien, supra note 17, at 142 (“What makes marriage
distinctive and worthy of entitlements is the state-sponsored commitment structure that
begins and continues through it.”).
88. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 664, 668 (2015) (“Marriage also affords
the permanency and stability important to children’s best interests.”); Baskin v. Bogan, 766
F.3d 648, 661 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[Marriage] enhance[es] child welfare by encouraging parents to commit to a stable relationship in which they will be raising the child together”); In
re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 423 (“Society, of course, has an overriding interest in the
welfare of children, and the role marriage plays in facilitating a stable family setting in
which children may be raised by two loving parents unquestionably furthers the welfare of
children and society.”); Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship,
and Sexual Privacy; Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463,
475–76 (1983) (arguing that stability and continuity “are so essential to child development
that they alone may justify the legal incentives and preferences traditionally given to permanent kinship units based on marriage”).
89. Huntington, supra note 14, at 196–202.
90. Id. at 170.
91. Norman, 663 P.2d at 910; Harrod v. Pac. Sw. Airlines, Inc., 118 Cal. App. 3d 155,
158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
92. See Harrod, 118 Cal. App. 3d at 158 (rejecting the equal protection and due process claims of an unmarried cohabitant who was precluded from bringing a wrongful death
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A more moderate form of the constitutional argument provides that a
constitutional right to nonmarriage might require the state to give some
property rights to nonmarital couples, but it concedes that such a fundamental right would not preclude the state from favorably treating marriage in comparison to nonmarriage.93 Thus, Professor Courtney Joslin
argues that a complete denial of protection for nonmarital partners may
infringe a fundamental right to nonmarriage.94 More specifically, with respect to nonmarital property rights, Joslin argues that the state’s failure to
provide nonmarital partners with some meaningful property-related
claims upon the dissolution of their partnership “raises significant constitutional concerns” given the autonomy interests of the cohabitants in entering into a nonmarital relationship and the significant financial harms
and stigma that such a denial would impose upon the nonmarital
partners.95
Yet Joslin acknowledges that “[t]here are plausible arguments in favor
of applying different property division rules to married couples and
nonmarital couples.”96 Indeed, Joslin cites empirical evidence—evidence
suggesting that cohabitation is a less stable family form than marriage and
that nonmarital partners are less likely to be financially interdependent
than are marital partners—as a seemingly reasonable justification for disparate treatment of marital and nonmarital couples.97 Similarly, Professor
Kaiponanea Matsumura concludes that a constitutional right not to
marry, if one exists, would not preclude the state from privileging marriage over nonmarriage, provided that the state refrains from coercive
disparate treatment.98 He notes that “the state has historically taken an
active role in promoting marriage and determining its legal incidents”
and that “[c]ourts have repeatedly held that the government can distribute benefits to married couples without running afoul of a right not to
marry.”99
Thus, again in light of the state’s interests in incentivizing familial commitment and stability, even the moderate form of the constitutional argument for positive nonmarital property rights should be rejected.
Although the Constitution may limit the state from coercing nonmarital
action following the death of her nonmarital partner, noting that “an action based on meretricious relationship presents greater problems of proof and dangers of fraudulent claims
than an action by a spouse or putative spouse”).
93. Joslin, supra note 47, at 431 (“[I]n arguing that the Constitution extends protection
to those living outside of marriage, I do not mean to suggest that any time the government
extends a particular protection to married people but not to unmarried people such differentiation is unconstitutional.”).
94. See generally id.
95. Id. at 481–83.
96. Id. at 482.
97. Id.; see also June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 100
(2016) (“Unmarried couples are less likely than married couples to commingle their
assets.”).
98. Matsumura, supra note 47, at 1546, 1555–56.
99. Id. at 1545. He adds that “history and precedent teach that states need not safeguard the choice to marry from any state encouragement.” Id. at 1512.
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cohabitants into marriage, the state need not provide any marital property rights to those who choose not to marry.100 Rather, the state is free
to insist that nonmarital cohabitants may obtain the property rights the
state offers to incentivize marriage only by entering into marriage.101
The more serious arguments in favor of equal treatment between marital relationships and nonmarital relationships are policy-based. A number
of influential academics and law reformers have advanced such nonmarriage equality arguments.102 In broadly advocating for law reform that
would seek to promote the economic and emotional security of all families and would reject special rights for marital families that are not available to nonmarital family forms, Professor Nancy Polikoff has argued that
“[c]ouples should have the choice to marry based on the spiritual, cultural, or religious meaning of marriage in their lives; they should never
have to marry to reap specific and unique legal benefits.”103 Professor
Polikoff explains, “The most important element in implementing this approach is identifying the purpose of a law that now grants marriage
unique legal consequences. By understanding a law’s purpose, we can
identify the relationships that would further that purpose without creating a special status for married couples.”104
The American Law Institute’s (ALI) Principles of Family Dissolution
(ALI Principles) endorse a more limited nonmarriage equality by providing for nearly identical inter se remedies for domestic partners as for marital spouses upon dissolution of their partnership, but no rights for
100. Murray, supra note 36, at 1211 (“Obergefell, with its pro-marriage rhetoric,
preempts the possibility of relationship and family pluralism in favor of a constitutional
landscape in which marriage exists alone as the constitutionally protected option for family
and relationship formation.”); see also id. at 1248–49.
101. See Blumenthal v. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d 834, 860 (Ill. 2016) (“Since marriage is a legal
relationship that all individuals may or may not enter into, Illinois does not act irrationally
or discriminatorily in refusing to grant benefits and protections under the [Illinois] Marriage and Dissolution Act to those who do not participate in the institution of marriage.”);
see also Willard v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 592 P.2d 1103, 1106–07 (Wash.
1979) (en banc) (holding that a state regulation that included both parents of a child in an
assistance unit when the parents were married to each other but included only one parent
of a child in an assistance unit if the parents were not married to each other did not violate
the equal protection rights of the excluded unmarried parent); cf. Califano v. Jobst, 434
U.S. 47, 53–54 (1977) (“Since it was rational for Congress to assume that marital status is a
relevant test of probable dependency, the general rule . . . terminating all child’s benefits
when the beneficiary married[ ] satisfied the constitutional test normally applied in cases
like this.”); Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 289 (1979) (“Congress could reasonably conclude that a [surviving parent] who has never been married to the wage earner [decedent
parent] is far less likely to be dependent upon the wage earner at the time of [their]
death.”).
102. See, e.g., Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1166–67 (1981) (proposing that certain nonmarital cohabitants be treated as equivalent to marital spouses for purposes of property division and
support claims at the dissolution of the nonmarital partnership and that all nonmarital
cohabitants be treated as equivalent to marital spouses for purposes of intestate distribution and the forced share when the nonmarital partnership ends at the death of a partner).
103. POLIKOFF, supra note 37, at 3.
104. Id. at 5.
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domestic partners against the state or third parties.105 The ALI Principles,
which the ALI adopted in 2000, are premised on the notion that in many
cases “the absence of formal marriage may have little or no bearing on
the character of the parties’ domestic relationship and on the equitable
considerations that underlie claims between lawful spouses at the dissolution of a marriage.”106 Thus, at the fracture of a qualifying domestic partnership, the ALI Principles would extend the rules that apply to spouses
for allocation of marital property and entitlement to “compensatory payments,” as though the domestic partners had been married during their
domestic partnership.107
More recently, Professor Lawrence Waggoner proposed for discussion
a “De Facto Marriage Act,” significantly informed by the ALI Principles,
which would grant all federal and state marital rights to qualifying
nonmarital cohabitants.108 Professor Waggoner justifies granting full marital property rights to certain nonmarital cohabiting couples by citing
what he sees as a consensus that has emerged in legislation in Australia,
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and Scotland, as well as the ALI proposal, in favor of treating sufficiently committed nonmarital couples as married-in-fact.109 In fact, Ireland and Scotland grant only lesser nonmarital
property rights to unlicensed cohabitants.110
Moreover, it is worth noting that the domestic partnership provisions
of the ALI Principles have failed to gain legislative acceptance anywhere
in the United States in the two decades after the ALI’s adoption of
them.111 Thus, the ALI Principles serve as a cautionary tale for those
105. IRA MARK ELLMAN, ALI FAMILY LAW REPORT (2000), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=241418 [https://perma.cc/2QKC-MA3M] (“Once parties are
considered domestic partners, the dissolution of their relationship triggers property and
compensatory payment . . . remedies that overlap almost entirely with those available at
the dissolution of marriage.”).
106. PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAM. DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 6.02 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2002) (asserting that certain domestic relationships “closely
resemble marriages in function, and their termination therefore poses the same social and
legal issues as does the dissolution of a marriage”).
107. Id. §§ 6.04–06 (establishing the principal exception to the identical treatment of
spouses and domestic partners under the ALI Principles that domestic partners do not
qualify for recharacterization of separate property as partnership property); see id.
§ 6.04(3) (“Property that would be recharacterized as marital property under § 4.12 if the
parties had been married is not domestic-partnership property.”).
108. Waggoner, supra note 1, at 81–93.
109. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marriage Is on the Decline and Cohabitation Is on the
Rise: At What Point, if Ever, Should Unmarried Partners Acquire Marital Rights?, 50 FAM.
L.Q. 215, 216 (2016).
110. See Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010
(Act No. 24/2010) §§ 173–175, 187 (Ir.) (setting out lesser rights for qualifying nonmarital
cohabitants); Family Law Act 2006, (ASP 2) §§ 25–29 (Scot.) (also giving lesser rights to
qualifying nonmarital cohabitants).
111. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 97, at 66 (“The ALI Principles effectively make the
same remedies available following the dissolution of a cohabitation as a marriage, but the
provision subjecting domestic partners and married couples to the same equitable division
and alimony rules have not been fully adopted by any state.”); Scott & Scott, supra note 56,
at 343 n.189, 359 (noting that the ALI Principles’ domestic partnership provisions “have
gained little traction” and that “American states have not adopted either the Principles or
the domestic-partnership status”).
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hoping to see nonmarital property law reform enacted; enactment of legislation extending equal marital property rights to nonmarital partners
may not be politically feasible in the near term.112 Law reform advocates
might better serve nonmarital families by crafting reforms that legislatures are more likely to enact.113
One powerful political objection to reform implementing a nonmarriage equality principle is likely to be that such reform would discourage
and undermine marriage.114 Indeed, Professor Waggoner once advanced
such an argument, although his most recent proposal evidences that his
views on nonmarriage equivalence have evolved. His earlier scholarship
proposed intestacy reform that favors unmarried committed partners by
granting a surviving partner a lesser interest in the decedent partner’s
estate than the survivor would have received had the couple been married “to maintain the incentive to enter into a formal marriage.”115
Leaving political necessity or prudence aside, a nonmarital property
rights structure that calculates a nonmarital partner’s award as a proper
fraction of a marital property award may be justified in light of the
greater commitment that marriage signifies.116 As the Massachusetts Su112. See UNIF. COHABITANTS’ ECON. REMEDIES ACT prefatory note (UNIF. L. COMM’N
2021) (labeling the provisions of the ALI Principles relating to cohabitants “ambitious”
and “perhaps radical”); Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance on the Fringes of Marriage, 2018 U.
ILL. L. REV. 235, 250–51 (advocating for intestate inheritance rights for fiancés and suggesting that setting the intestate share for a surviving fiancé at less than the share for a
surviving spouse “might prove a political necessity”). But see Waggoner, supra note 1, at 83
(speculating that the ALI Principles may have failed to achieve legislative acceptance because “[t]he ALI is not organized to take any post-publication action to promote enactment of its Principles Statutes”).
113. See Gary, supra note 42, at 824 (proposing intestacy reform that would make
nonmarital partners potential heirs but not default heirs, and arguing that although some
nonmarital partners may feel that her proposal does not go far enough, “being a potential
heir is better than not being an heir at all”).
114. Garrison, supra note 48, at 857, 861 (arguing that treating cohabitation and marriage as equivalent “discourages marital commitment and investment” and “devalues marriage”); see also Spitko, Intestate Inheritance Rights, supra note 71, at 2191 (noting that the
principal objection to extension of legal protections to unmarried committed partners in
Scotland was the concern that such reform “would undermine marriage and discourage
people from marrying”); Mary Louise Fellows, Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson, Amy Chiericozzi, Ann Hale, Christopher Lee, Robin Preble & Michael Voran, Committed Partners
and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. 1, 14 (1998) (reporting the concern
that inclusion of unmarried committed partners in the intestacy scheme would be inconsistent with the role of intestacy law in supporting traditional marriage). But see Albertina
Antognini, The Law of Nonmarriage, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1, 57 (2017) (arguing that failure to
confer nonmarital property rights may “impose competing incentives onto the individuals
in the relationship, at least in considering property distribution: the man may seek to avoid
marriage in order to retain his assets, while the woman may seek out that very status in
order to ensure her property rights when the couple separates”); PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF
FAM. DISSOLUTION § 6.02 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2002) (reasoning that “to the extent that
some individuals avoid marriage in order to avoid responsibilities to a partner, this Chapter
[providing for nonmarital property rights] reduces the incentive to avoid marriage because
it diminishes the effectiveness of that strategy”).
115. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 MO. L. REV. 21,
80 (1994).
116. Hirsch, supra note 112, at 250–51 (arguing that an intestate share assigned to a
surviving fiancé probably should be less than the intestate share assigned to a surviving
spouse “given gradations of commitment”).
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preme Court has explained, “[I]t is the exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one another . . . that is the sine qua non
of civil marriage.”117 Marriage generally involves a formal, public, and
express commitment by the partners to care for one another, in good
times and in bad, in sickness and in health, until death do them part.118 In
contrast, the commitments arising from cohabitation are far more ambiguous.119 Indeed, as noted above, there is significant evidence that
nonmarital cohabitation is less stable than marriage, and nonmarital cohabitants are less financially interdependent than are marital partners.120
Unquestionably, many married persons do not live up to the ideal of
marital commitment. Conversely, many nonmarital partners demonstrate
a commitment equal to that of the ideal marital spouse.121 Still,
nonmarital property law reform should appropriately take into account
the less certain commitment to mutual caregiving that generally arises
from cohabitation, in contrast with marriage, by granting to nonmarital
partners lesser property rights as compared to those granted to marital
partners.122
B. COMPATIBILITY WITH THE VALUES AND NORMS
MARITAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

THAT

GROUND

Nonmarital property law reform should reflect the core substantive values and process norms that ground marital property law. Structuring
nonmarital property rights to maximize compatibility with marital property law’s values and norms will tend to minimize the likelihood that
117. Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003).
118. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987) (“[I]nmate marriages, like others, are
expressions of emotional support and public commitment” and “expression[s] of personal
dedication”); Garrison, supra note 48, at 817, 824; Lifshitz, supra note 70, at 1594 (noting
that marriage “enables a person to pre-commit herself and hence to signal to her spouse,
children, and society as a whole the scope and seriousness of her commitment”); see also
Widiss, supra note 50, at 563 (“[F]ederal laws typically use marriage as an administratively
convenient mechanism for identifying couples who are likely to have made a long-term
commitment to each other, and/or likely to have intertwined finances.”).
119. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 97, at 94 (“[M]arried couples make an unqualified
commitment to each other—for better or worse, in sickness and in health—while unmarried couples typically make a more contingent one.”); Scott & Scott, supra note 56, at 360
(“The decision not to marry when marriage is an option sends a confusing signal about the
nature of cohabitants’ relationships and the extent to which they are defined by familycommitment norms.”).
120. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 97, at 68 (“Unmarried couples are less likely than
married couples to embrace financial interdependence.”); Scott & Scott, supra note 56, at
311–12, 360 (“Researchers have found that cohabitants have lower levels of commitment
to their relationships than do married couples; perhaps for this reason, informal unions
typically are far less stable than marriages.” (footnote omitted)); Waggoner, supra note
109, at 215 (observing that most cohabitants “either break up or get married fairly
quickly”).
121. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 97, at 59 (noting that some cohabitations “involve
profound commitments equivalent in every respect to the strongest marriages—except
state sanction”).
122. See id. at 118 (“Recognizing nonmarriage as a legitimate system on its own terms
requires acknowledging the different patterns of commitment between adults and to
children.”).

2022]

Nonmarital Property Rights

171

nonmarital property law reform will undermine marriage. Such compatibility also should facilitate adoption and implementation of nonmarital
property law reform.
Thus, appreciating why society privileges marriage is a critical issue for
nonmarital property law reform. The answer to this question differs depending on whether both of the marital partners are living or the marriage has ended at the death of a marital partner. The apex value of
family law, as distinct from succession law, is the promotion and facilitation of the legal family’s private support of family dependencies.123 Federal and state governments leverage their support of “family” to
maximize the likelihood that family members will take care of one another, while minimizing the necessity of state support of dependent family members.124 Dean Laura Rosenbury has explained,
Instead of bestowing positive rights to [certain benefits], states bestow the status of spouse, parent, or child and attach limited benefits
to them. Indeed, the most robust benefit may be the right to family
privacy, a negative right available only to those who opt into legal
family status. In exchange for this privacy, families are largely expected to address their own needs; if they do not, the state often
intervenes in a punitive fashion.125
In succession law, in contrast to family law generally, incentivizing the
legal family’s private support function plays a subsidiary but still significant role.126 The right of a surviving spouse to elect a forced share of the
decedent spouse’s estate, for example, is grounded in part on the notion
that the marital support obligation to some degree survives the death of a
spouse.127 The forced share, however, is a rarity in succession law in that
it curtails, rather than promotes, the decedent’s donative freedom.128
Without question, the central principle of American succession law is
123. Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private Family Support, 67 VAND. L. REV.
1835, 1865 (2014) (arguing that “the ultimate value underlying legal recognition of family
[is] the value of private family support”).
124. Id. at 1860 (“[G]overnment recognition of family ultimately appears rooted in the
desire to privatize the dependencies of family members, encouraging families to ‘take care
of their own’ with minimal financial assistance from the state.”).
125. Id. at 1867 (footnotes omitted).
126. See Spitko, supra note 40, at 278 (“Testamentary freedom also contributes to the
stability of the family by providing a financial incentive, if one is needed, for children and
more distant relations to care for their physically declining (and soon-to-be-devising) family members.”).
127. UNIF. PROB. CODE Art. II, Pt. 2 gen. cmt. (amended 2019) (“Another theoretical
basis for elective-share law is that the spouses’ mutual duties of support during their joint
lifetimes should be continued in some form after death in favor of the survivor, as a claim
on the decedent’s estate.”). The principal rationale for the modern elective share is the
theory that marriage is an economic partnership and, thus, both marital partners have a
right to share in the economic fruits of the marriage regardless of how the family wealth is
titled. Id.
128. Id. (noting that most states treat disinheritance of the surviving spouse “as one of
the few instances in American law where the decedent’s testamentary freedom with respect to his or her title-based ownership interests must be curtailed”).
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the promotion of donative freedom.129 Succession law favors the decedent’s spouse and children, for the most part, because of the empirically
grounded understanding that most decedents would want these family
members to take their estate to the exclusion of others.130 Succession law
privileges donative freedom, which in turn promotes several important
social policies. Chief among these policies is the maximization of
wealth.131 The right to pass one’s property at death to the persons or
entities of one’s choosing incentivizes the donor to continue to work diligently, invest productively, and consume prudently.132
Nonmarital property law reform ought to be concerned with not only
these primary substantive goals of marital property law, but also with
marital property law’s principal process norms. Here, too, the law of marital dissolution and succession law diverge. The law of marital dissolution
gives judges a high degree of discretion, empowering them to weigh a
host of considerations to arrive at an equitable distribution of marital
property between the spouses.133 In contrast, succession law prizes certainty and ease of administration of estates.134 This process norm
manifests in succession law’s overwhelming preference for fixed
entitlements.135
These process norms evolved to support the substantive values of their
respective spheres of law. Succession law’s preference for predictability,
for example, promotes donative freedom and the policies that ground
donative freedom; a property owner’s certainty during life that their estate plan will be given effect at their death increases the property owner’s
satisfaction and augments their incentive to maximize their wealth.136
The Scottish experience with intestacy law reform to include unmarried
committed partners is instructive on the dangers of ignoring relevant process norms. In 2006, Scotland enacted legislation extending intestate inheritance rights to certain unmarried committed partners.137 This Scottish
law reform granted to courts almost unlimited discretion to set the size, if
any, of a qualified surviving nonmarital cohabitant’s intestate share.138 In
sharp contrast, Scottish law grants fixed rights in the decedent spouse’s
129. See John H. Langbein, Destructive Federal Preemption of State Wealth Transfer
Law in Beneficiary Designation Cases: Hillman Doubles Down on Egelhoff, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 1665, 1677 (2014); Spitko, supra note 15, at 1068–71, 1074.
130. See Spitko, supra note 15, at 1070–71.
131. Spitko, supra note 40, at 278.
132. Id.
133. Strauss, supra note 7, at 1317.
134. UNIF. PROB. CODE Art. II, Pt. 2 gen. cmt. (amended 2019) (noting that “ease of
administration and predictability of result are prized features of the probate system”); cf.
Beren v. Beren, 349 P.3d 233, 242 (Colo. 2015) (“[T]he [Colorado Probate] Code normally
operates in favor of prompt disposition of estate matters”).
135. Spitko, supra note 15, at 1076–77.
136. See Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand,
68 IND. L.J. 1, 7–8 (1992) (discussing the relationship between the satisfaction arising from
bequeathing property to others and the normative goal of wealth maximization).
137. Family Law Act 2006, (ASP 2) §§ 25, 29 (Scot.).
138. Id. § 29(3)(d) (authorizing a court to consider “any other matter the court considers appropriate” in setting the size of an unmarried committed partner’s intestate share).
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testate or intestate estate to a surviving spouse and affords a court no
discretion in setting the amount of a spouse’s award.139 The Scottish intestacy law reform recognizing unmarried committed partners has given
rise to significant criticisms and calls for repeal among Scottish judges,
law reformers, academics, and practitioners because of the nearly unfettered judicial discretion and resulting uncertainty that the provisions introduced into Scottish inheritance law.140 Thus, the Scottish experience
has led me to conclude that U.S. law reformers concerned with
nonmarital property rights should seek to structure reform so “that the
tolerance for uncertainty in the intestacy statute’s cohabitation provisions . . . reflect[s] the tolerance for uncertainty found in the society’s
succession law generally.”141
In sum, to avoid being at cross-purposes with marriage, nonmarital
property law reform should respect the goals and process norms of marital property law. Thus, the law should protect nonmarital property rights
at dissolution, first and foremost, to encourage nonmarital cohabitants to
support one another and to support their children. In contrast, the law
should afford nonmarital property rights at the death of a cohabitant primarily to promote the donative intent of the decedent but also to serve
the goals of the state’s elective share provisions. Finally, nonmarital property law reform should be mindful of the ways in which the distinct process norms of marital dissolution law and marital succession law serve the
distinct cardinal substantive goals of these two bodies of law.
C. CONSIDERATION OF DURATION
A third critical issue that should be a focus for advocates of nonmarital
property law reform concerns the significance to nonmarital property
rights of both the duration of the cohabitation and the duration of the
relationship. Indeed, consideration of either cohabitation duration or relationship duration, or both, is a ubiquitous feature of nonmarital property rights statutes, case law, and reform proposals.142 These frameworks
The surviving unmarried committed partner’s intestate share may not exceed what the
partner would have received had she been married to the decedent. Id. § 29(4).
139. Spitko, Intestate Inheritance Rights, supra note 71, at 2190–91 (discussing Scottish
law’s protections for a surviving spouse with respect to the decedent spouse’s testate and
intestate estate). Unlike the law of England and Wales, Scottish inheritance law does not
provide for a discretionary family maintenance system. See Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975, W.S.I. 1975/63 (W. 1) art. 1, ¶ 1.
140. Spitko, Intestate Inheritance Rights, supra note 71, at 2189–91 (detailing criticisms
from these groups); Alison C. Hetherington, Cohabitation in Scots Succession Law: A Critical Examination of Section 29 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, 10 ABERDEEN STUDENT L. REV. 1, 11–13 (2020) (commenting that “over a decade after its introduction, it is
generally accepted that this [intestacy] provision is ‘unsatisfactory’ following the serious
issues arising from its application” and noting that the widespread criticism of the intestacy
reform has focused on the unguided judicial discretion and consequent inconsistency and
uncertainty that the reform introduced into Scottish intestacy law).
141. Spitko, Intestate Inheritance Rights, supra note 71, at 2196.
142. See Family Law Act 1975 ss 4AA(2)(a), 90SB(a) (Austl.); Waggoner, supra note
109, at 240.
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typically consider cohabitation or relationship duration as relevant to the
threshold question of whether the cohabitants fall within the scope of the
nonmarital property rights scheme, the appropriate amount of a
nonmarital property award under the scheme, or both of these issues.143
1. The Ubiquity of Duration
Comprehensive nonmarital property rights statutes abroad generally
treat the duration of the cohabitation or relationship as highly significant.
New Zealand’s “de facto relationship” statute is typical in its use of duration criteria.144 Under New Zealand law, a “de facto relationship” gives
rise to most of the property rights of marriage.145 To qualify for de facto
relationship status, the partners must have lived together as de facto partners for a minimum of three years unless the couple is raising a child
together or one partner “has made a substantial contribution” to the relationship.146 Moreover, once a claimant satisfies this duration prerequisite,
the assessment as to whether the partners “live[d] together as a couple,” a
critical element in the statute’s definition of a de facto relationship, focuses on “the duration of the relationship,” among other factors.147
Similar to New Zealand’s use of duration, Australia and Ireland utilize
cohabitation or relationship duration in both a qualifying period and a
statutory definition of cohabitants.148 The duration prerequisite, subject
to exceptions, is two years in Australia and five years in Ireland.149 Ireland also treats duration of the relationship as a relevant consideration
for the court in determining the amount of a nonmarital property
award.150
Scotland’s nonmarital property rights statute does not utilize a qualify143. See infra notes 144–166.
144. See generally Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (N.Z.).
145. See, e.g., id. ss 11–14 (governing division of relationship property).
146. Id. ss 1C(2)(b), 2E(1)(b), 14A.
147. Id. s 2D(2)(a). A New Zealand court deciding whether two people “live[d] together as a couple” must consider “the nature and extent of common residence,” but the
partners need not live in the same household to qualify under the statute. Id. ss 2D(2)(b),
2D(3).
148. Family Law Act 1975 ss 4AA(2)(a), 90SB(a) (Austl.); Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 (Act No. 24/2010) § 172(2)(a), (5)(b)
(Ir.).
149. Family Law Act 1975 s 90SB(a) (Austl.); Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and
Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 (Act No. 24/2010) § 172(5)(b) (Ir.).
Several Canadian provinces also use duration prerequisites in their nonmarital property
rights frameworks. See, e.g., Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, R.S.A. 2002, c A-4.5,
§ 3(1) (Alberta) (prescribing a three-year cohabitation prerequisite); Family Law Act,
S.B.C. 2011, c 25, § 3(1)(b)(i) (British Columbia) (prescribing a two-year cohabitation prerequisite); Family Property Act, C.C.S.M. 2017, c F25 § 1(1) (Manitoba) (prescribing a
three-year cohabitation prerequisite); Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c F.3 § 29(a) (Ontario)
(prescribing a three-year cohabitation prerequisite); Family Law Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1997, c
18, § 1(1) (Northwest Territories and Nunavut) (prescribing a two-year cohabitation prerequisite); Family Property Act, R.S.S. 1997, c F-6.3, § 2(1) (Saskatchewan) (prescribing a
two-year cohabitation prerequisite).
150. Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010
(Act No. 24/2010) § 173(3)(e) (Ir.).
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ing period.151 The Scottish framework utilizes duration, however, in defining a “cohabitant.” One of three factors a Scottish court “shall have
regard to” in determining whether an applicant qualifies as a cohabitant
is “the length of the period during which [the nonmarital partners] have
been living together (or lived together).”152
In the United States, Washington state case law—the most comprehensive scheme in the United States for recognizing nonmarital property
rights—utilizes duration criteria in determining which cohabitants are eligible for equitable distribution of property acquired during their cohabitation and also in determining how that property should be equitably
distributed.153 Under Washington law, as noted earlier, duration of the
relationship is one of five nonexclusive relevant factors a court uses in
analyzing whether a “meretricious relationship” existed such that, at fracture of the relationship, the court will equitably distribute property acquired during the relationship.154 If the court finds that a meretricious
relationship existed and proceeds to equitably distribute the property acquired during the meretricious relationship, the court may look to Washington’s statute for the disposition of property upon dissolution of a
marriage for guidance.155 That statute provides that duration of the marriage is one of four nonexclusive factors that the court shall consider in
making an equitable distribution.156 In U.S. states with less comprehensive nonmarital property rights frameworks, duration criteria can be relevant to an express or implied contract claim or a claim for equitable
relief.157
Finally, consideration of cohabitation duration or relationship duration
also has been a significant feature of prominent nonmarital property law
reform proposals both in the United States and abroad.158 The ALI Prin151. See Family Law Act 2006, (ASP 2) §§ 25–29 (Scot.).
152. Id. § 25(2)(a).
153. Warden v. Warden, 676 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (applying “the least
fictional analysis,” which “recognize[s] that certain meretricious relationships of long and
durable standing may give rise to community property rights similar to those which prevail
between married persons”).
154. In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 770–71 (Wash. 2000) (en banc); Connell
v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (Wash. 1995) (en banc).
155. In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d at 770; Connell, 898 P.2d at 835.
156. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080(3) (West 2021).
157. See Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 438 (W. Va. 1990) (holding that principles of
express and implied contract and constructive trust may support an order dividing
nonmarital cohabitants’ property acquired during their relationship and that “[f]actors to
be considered in ordering such a division of property may include: the purpose, duration,
and stability of the relationship and the expectations of the parties”); Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d
672, 674 (Nev. 1984) (holding that a nonmarital cohabitant’s complaint had sufficiently
stated a cause of action for breach of an implied-in-fact contract and commenting that
“[e]ach case should be assessed on its own merits with consideration given to the purpose,
duration and stability of the relationship and the expectations of the parties”).
158. See, e.g., Waggoner, supra note 109, at 240 (listing relationship duration as a factor
that courts should consider in deciding whether nonmarital cohabitants qualify as “de facto
spouses” entitled to marital property rights and establishing a rebuttable presumption that
two people had a committed relationship if the couple “shared a common household with
their minor children for a continuous period totaling [four] or more years” (alteration in
original)); Lifshitz, supra note 70, at 1603–05, 1621–22 (proposing nonmarital property law
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ciples, for example, define qualified domestic partners as “two persons . . . not married to one another, who for a significant period of time
share a primary residence and a life together as a couple.”159 The ALI
Principles also establish a rebuttable presumption that two persons are
domestic partners “when they have maintained a common household . . .
for a continuous period that equals or exceeds a duration . . . set in a rule
of statewide application.”160 Moreover, the size of “compensatory payments” to a domestic partner under the ALI Principles also depends
upon the duration of the partners’ cohabitation.161
The more recent 2021 Uniform Cohabitants’ Economic Remedies Act
(UCERA) also utilizes duration, although less extensively.162 In 2018, in
response to the dramatic increase in cohabitation in the United States,
the Uniform Law Commission convened a committee to draft a “model
law to standardize the economic rights of unmarried cohabitants.”163 The
end product—UCERA—is a modest “enabling act” that merely seeks to
protect the rights of cohabitants to bring contractual and equitable claims
against a fellow cohabitant “without subjecting them to hurdles that
would not be imposed on [non-cohabitant] litigants of similar claims.”164
UCERA does not employ duration in its definition of a “cohabitant.”165 UCERA, however, expressly makes duration relevant to the resolution of a cohabitant’s claim for equitable relief. Section 7 of the
uniform law provides that “the court adjudicating a claim [for equitable
relief] shall consider . . . the duration and continuity of the
cohabitation.”166
reform that would utilize a minimum cohabitation period prerequisite for “regular” cohabitation rights and would provide enhanced “relational” cohabitation rights arising only
from longer-term cohabitations); SCOTTISH L. COMM’N, REPORT ON SUCCESSION 157–58
(2009), https://scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/7112/7989/7451/rep215.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2XZWD9Q] (concerning inheritance rights for nonmarital cohabitants and listing cohabitation
duration as one of three exclusive factors that a court shall use to determine the portion of
the decedent nonmarital cohabitant’s testate or intestate estate to which the surviving
nonmarital cohabitant shall be entitled).
159. PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAM. DISSOLUTION § 6.03(1) (AM. L. INST. 2002).
160. Id. § 6.03(3).
161. See id. § 6.06(1).
162. See generally UNIF. COHABITANTS’ ECON. REMEDIES ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N
2021).
163. UNIF. L. COMM’N, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 11 (2017–2018)
UNIF. COHABITANTS’ ECON. REMEDIES ACT prefatory note (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021) (stating that UCERA “responds to the dramatic increase in the number of nonmarital cohabitants in the United States over the past half-century”).
164. UNIF. COHABITANTS’ ECON. REMEDIES ACT prefatory note (UNIF. L. COMM’N
2021); see also id. § 4(a)(2) (2021) (providing that a cohabitant’s contractual or equitable
claim arising from contributions to the cohabiting relationship “is not . . . subject to additional substantive or procedural requirements because the parties are or were cohabitants
or because of a sexual relationship between the cohabitants”).
165. Id. § 2(1) (defining “cohabitant” without reference to relationship duration or cohabitation duration); id. at prefatory note (“The term [cohabitant] does not set a time limit
as to how long the individuals must cohabit in order to meet the definition.”).
166. Id. § 7(c)(2).
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2. The Utilities of Duration
Use of duration criteria in nonmarital property rights frameworks has
at least two principal purposes, both of which are related to the informal
nature of nonmarital cohabitation.167 First, duration of the nonmarital cohabitation or duration of the relationship can serve as an indication of the
commitment of the nonmarital partners to one another and to the relationship.168 Entry into a nonmarital cohabitation lacks the public declaration of commitment that is intrinsic to the entry into a marriage.169 For
nonmarital cohabitants, therefore, the passage of time substitutes for the
public declaration of marriage as a signal to society and to the cohabitants themselves of their commitment to each other and their
relationship.170
Second, a durational prerequisite or qualifying period can be designed
to give the parties a temporary safe harbor from the obligations that the
nonmarital property rights framework otherwise would impose on
nonmarital cohabitants.171 Thus, a durational prerequisite protects cohabitants who may not understand the nuances of the nonmarital property
rights framework at the outset of their cohabiting relationship.172 A durational prerequisite also affords the cohabitants the opportunity to experience living together as a couple before deciding whether to assume
mutual nonmarital property obligations.173
This Article’s reform proposal makes use of cohabitation duration for
both of these purposes. The proposal utilizes a durational prerequisite so
that its framework of nonmarital property rights and responsibilities does
not apply to short-term cohabitants.174 The proposal also employs duration as a marker for commitment by assigning greater nonmarital property rights as the duration of the nonmarital cohabitation increases.175
167. Cf. Spitko, supra note 35, at 295–300 (arguing that the duration of a nonmarital
cohabitation is likely to correlate positively with a decedent partner’s intent to provide at
death for the surviving cohabitant and with the survivor’s contributions to the decedent
and the survivor’s reliance interests in their partnership).
168. N.Z. L. COMM’N, REVIEW OF THE PROPERTY (RELATIONSHIPS) ACT 1976: PREFERRED APPROACH, 82 (2018), https://www.lawcom.govt.nz/sites/default/files/projectAvailableFormats/PRA%20-%20Preferred%20Approach%20-%20Issue%20Paper%2044%20%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8FA-5956] Scott & Scott, supra note 56, at 363–64
(“Well-designed proxies such as [significant duration of the cohabitation] would allow regulators to sort cohabitants in family relationships from those whose commitment (and social value) is less compelling.”).
169. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 97, at 95 (noting that, in contrast to marital partners,
“[u]nmarried partners . . . may enter into and leave relationships without formalities and
often without explicit markers commemorating the changing status of a relationship”).
170. N.Z. L. COMM’N, supra note 168, at 82 (“In the absence of a deliberate decision by
the partners to formalise their relationship by getting married . . . the passage of time is
used to indicate when a relationship has reached a sufficient level of commitment that
justifies the imposition of property sharing obligations.”).
171. Id. at 82–83.
172. Bill Atkin, Family Property, in FAMILY LAW POLICY IN NEW ZEALAND 209, 216
(Mark Henaghan & Bill Atkin eds., 2013).
173. N.Z. L. COMM’N, supra note 168, at 82.
174. See supra Section II.C.1.
175. See supra Section II.C.2.
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Moreover, this reform proposal is fully consistent with the two other
principles that this Part argues should ground nonmarital property rights
reform. First, the reform proposal affords only lesser rights for
nonmarital cohabitants relative to marital partners. Second, by its very
nature, the proposal is fully compatible with the substantive values and
process norms that ground marital property rights.176 In the next Part, the
Article turns to a thorough explanation of my proposal for integrated
nonmarital property rights reform.
III. AN INTEGRATED ACCRUAL ADAPTOR FOR
NONMARITAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
I propose an integrated “accrual adaptor” that would structure
nonmarital property rights at dissolution and at death. This Part explains
how such an accrual adaptor would apply to nonmarital property rights
across the board. This Part further discusses the significant merits of my
proposed reform and evaluates the likely primary criticism of an integrated approach to nonmarital property law reform.
In short, as this Part details, my proposed framework would allow a
qualifying nonmarital cohabitant to claim any marital property right, but
the nonmarital entitlement would be reduced in value relative to a marital property award to reflect the fact that the claim arises from a
nonmarital cohabitation rather than a marriage. Thus, calculation of a
nonmarital property interest would begin by considering what marital
property award the claimant would have been entitled to had they been
married to their partner during the entirety of their cohabitation. This
preliminary award would then be discounted, with the discount off the
marital property award being inversely proportional to the duration of
the nonmarital cohabitation.
A. QUALIFICATION OF AN APPLICANT AS
COMMITTED PARTNER

AN

UNMARRIED

Any provision of a nonmarital property right to an unmarried committed partner involves two principal steps: qualification of an applicant as
an unmarried committed partner and quantification of the nonmarital
property right. This Article deals primarily with the latter. Still, a
thoughtful evaluation of the Article’s proposed scheme for calculation of
a nonmarital property interest requires an appreciation of the nature of
the means for qualification of the unmarried committed partner.
Statutory reform might provide for qualification of nonmarital partners
via a registration scheme, which enables self-identification; a multi-factor
approach, which requires a court to evaluate the nature and quality of the
relationship against a statutorily defined standard; or a combination of
176. See supra Section II.B.
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the two.177 While the registration approach has the virtue of certainty, it
suffers from the same type of underinclusiveness as the marital property
regime in that it excludes otherwise deserving applicants who failed to
formalize their union with the state.178 The multi-factor approach mitigates underinclusiveness but at the cost of increased uncertainty that a
subjective inquiry necessarily entails.179
The combination registration/multi-factor approach is preferable.180
The combination approach lessens underinclusiveness through its multifactor component while affording committed partners the option of certainty through the safe harbor of registration. Thus, the combination approach introduces uncertainty in fewer cases.181 Still, a significant degree
of uncertainty remains a feature of the combination registration/multifactor approach given that a claimant may seek to qualify as an unmarried committed partner by means of a subjective inquiry.
My proposal for an integrated accrual adaptor for nonmarital property
rights is designed to accommodate this uncertainty through the accrual
mechanism discussed in detail below. The rationale is that society can be
more confident of a cohabiting couple’s commitment to their relationship
and to one another the longer their relationship endures. Thus, the accrual mechanism gradually increases nonmarital property awards as cohabitation duration increases, along with society’s certainty in the
commitment of the cohabitants.
B. QUANTIFICATION

OF THE

NONMARITAL PROPERTY RIGHT

Given a policy or political decision to structure nonmarital property
law reform so that a nonmarital partner’s property award does not mirror
that of a similarly-situated marital partner, my proposed integrated accrual adaptor for nonmarital property rights has much to recommend it as
a means to implement a decision to differentiate between marital and
nonmarital property rights. My proposed accrual adaptor translates marital property rights into nonmarital property rights by discounting the former. Thus, the accrual adaptor approach affords lesser property rights to
nonmarital partners in contrast with marital partners in similar circumstances. As discussed below, the integrated adaptor feature of my proposal has the virtue of simplicity of design and the related virtue of inherent
compatibility with the adopting jurisdiction’s marital property law substantive values and process norms. Moreover, the accrual feature of my
proposal builds a reasoned proportionality into nonmarital property law
reform, so that the size of any nonmarital property award reflects the
level of confidence that outside parties can have that the nonmarital part177. Spitko, supra note 35, at 259–61 (discussing the merits and demerits of each
approach).
178. Id. at 259–60.
179. Id. at 260–61.
180. T.P. Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for Domestic Partners, 79 TUL. L. REV. 55, 84
(2004); Spitko, supra note 35, at 261.
181. Spitko, supra note 35, at 261.

180

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

ners at issue committed to performing caregiving functions for one
another.
1. The Adaptor Feature
Whatever the nonmarital property right at issue, my scheme would require a court to first calculate a preliminary award that the qualified
nonmarital partner applicant would have received under parallel marital
property law had the applicant been a marital partner. The court would
then apply an adaptor to this preliminary award to calculate the final
nonmarital property award.182 Thus, the adaptor would work with
whatever rules the jurisdiction applies to the parallel marital property
right at issue to translate the marital property right into a nonmarital
property right.183
For example, assume an adaptor with a fixed value of 25%. Assume
further that a court using the state’s marital property law calculates a
preliminary property award for the nonmarital cohabitant claimant valued at $100,000, which represents what the claimant would have received
had they been married to their partner during their cohabitation. The
court would then use the adaptor to translate that $100,000 marital property figure into a nonmarital property award valued at $25,000.184
A virtue of the proposed adaptor is its simplicity.185 The adaptor works
with a jurisdiction’s existing marital property law. Thus, a legislature
might adopt my proposal without having to create any novel corresponding property law structures for the nonmarital context and, indeed, without otherwise modifying the jurisdiction’s law of property division,
support, intestacy, or the elective share.186
182. Cf. SCOTTISH L. COMM’N, supra note 158, app. A, at 157 (directing a court to consider several factors in determining an “appropriate percentage” of the decedent cohabitant’s testate or intestate estate to which the qualified surviving cohabitant would have
been entitled had she been the decedent’s spouse or civil partner (citing Succession Bill
(Draft) §§ 22(3), 23(2) (Scot.)).
183. Thus, my instant proposal differs from my 2002 proposal for an accrual/multi-factor approach to intestate inheritance rights for unmarried committed partners in that the
latter is a stand-alone reform that would override a jurisdiction’s existing intestacy scheme.
See generally Spitko, supra note 35.
184. In 2009, the Scottish Law Commission proposed succession law reform for
nonmarital cohabitants that would have directed courts “to decide to what extent the surviving cohabitant deserves to be treated as the deceased’s spouse or civil partner for the
purposes of the rules of succession.” SCOTTISH L. COMM’N, supra note 158, at 72. The
proposed reform would have given courts discretion, after considering several exclusive
factors, to award to the surviving cohabitant an “appropriate percentage” of the decedent
cohabitant’s estate to which the survivor would have been entitled had she been the spouse
or civil partner of the decedent cohabitant. Id. at 157. The Scottish Parliament did not
enact the proposed reform.
185. Cf. Gary, supra note 42, at 810–11 (speculating that recent changes to the Uniform
Probate Code have not been widely adopted because of their complexity).
186. See Bill Atkin, The Legal World of Unmarried Couples: Reflections on “De Facto
Relationships” in Recent New Zealand Legislation, 39 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV.
793, 794 (2009) (commenting with respect to New Zealand’s nearly identical treatment of
marital spouses and “de facto relationship” partners that “there are advantages in drawing
upon the same body of jurisprudence instead of re-inventing the wheel each time an issue
arises”); O’Brien, supra note 17, at 137 (commenting with respect to the ALI Principles,
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This simplicity should work to the advantage of nonmarital cohabitants. Because the proposed reform uses existing rather than novel structures, cohabitants are more likely to be familiar, at least broadly, with the
governing structures. Thus, nonmarital cohabitants should be relatively
more aware of the need to opt out of the default law when that law is at
odds with their wishes and expectations.
Further, because the proposed adaptor simply fits over a jurisdiction’s
existing marital property law structures, a legislature that adopts the proposal also need not rethink the principles that ground the jurisdiction’s
various marital property law doctrines. Thus, this simplicity of the proposed adaptor gives rise to a companion virtue of compatibility. The proposed adaptor would enable any jurisdiction to implement reform to
recognize unmarried committed partners that is wholly compatible with
the substantive values and process norms that ground the jurisdiction’s
various marital property law doctrines.
The adaptor also would ensure that nonmarital property law reform
would be low maintenance. The proposed reform would not require
amendment in response to future changes in marital property law.
Rather, those changes would be self-executing by means of the
adaptor.187
Another significant merit of the adaptor is that it best allows for an
integrated approach to nonmarital property rights at dissolution and at
death. An integrated scheme, as contrasted with a piecemeal approach,
would extend all types of marital property rights to a qualifying
nonmarital couple. Thus, the scheme would apply to property division
and support claims at the dissolution of a nonmarital partnership and
would also apply to the claim of a surviving partner for an intestate share
or a forced share of the decedent partner’s estate when the nonmarital
partnership ends at the death of a partner.
An integrated approach to nonmarital property law reform has at least
one significant advantage over piecemeal reform. Comprehensive reform
should avoid some of the perverse incentives to which piecemeal reform
is likely to give rise. For example, if a jurisdiction were to provide property rights when a nonmarital cohabitation ends at breakup, but not when
a nonmarital cohabitation ends at death, an unmarried committed partner who quits the relationship may fare better financially than they would
have had they stayed committed to the relationship until the death of a
partner.188 On the other hand, where the jurisdiction provides nonmarital
which would provide domestic partners upon dissolution of their partnership with nearly
identical inter se remedies as those afforded to marital spouses, that “providing property
and support in a manner identical to married spouses would provide state courts with
guidelines familiar to those historically used”).
187. Hetherington, supra note 140, at 22 (“The further benefits of the [Scottish Law
Commission]’s suggestions are that this system of calculating a percentage of what an
equivalent spouse of civil partner would be entitled to is much more robust.”).
188. See Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass. 1984) (“It is neither equitable
nor logical to extend to a divorced spouse greater rights in the assets of an inter vivos trust
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property rights only at the death of a partner, an unmarried committed
partner may feel pressured to remain in an unhealthy or unsafe
nonmarital partnership.
Conversely, an integrated approach to nonmarital property rights risks
significant disadvantages that should be considered. Chief among these
drawbacks is that an integrated approach is likely to complicate
nonmarital property law reform both politically and as a matter of design.
As discussed below, however, the adaptor helps mitigate this principal
disadvantage, arguably tipping the balance in favor of an integrated
approach.
The design complication arises from the fact that different and sometimes conflicting principles ground the various subsets of marital property
law. For example, if reformers are thinking about qualifying a nonmarital
partner for the purposes of intestacy reform, they might reasonably focus
on the decedant’s intent.189 If reformers are contemplating qualifying a
nonmarital partner for the purposes of an elective share or for the purposes of property division, however, focusing on donative intent may be
self-defeating.
One way to mitigate this design complication would be to tinker with
the means for defining a nonmarital partner. The multi-factor approach
to qualification of a nonmarital partner might be structured at a fairly
general level with all or most elements focusing on the cohabitants’ commitment to each other and to their relationship. The defining statute
might then add a final factor allowing the court to consider the nature of
the relationship in light of the purpose or purposes for which a partner is
being qualified. For example, New Zealand utilizes a scheme for the qualification of de facto partners, for use with statutes that do not contain
their own definition of that term, that directs the court or person considering the issue to “have regard to . . . the context, or the purpose of the
law, in which the question is to be determined.”190
An integrated approach to nonmarital property rights may further
complicate law reform given that some components of comprehensive reform may be less politically feasible than others. The Scottish experience
with inheritance law reform efforts provides a prime example. By 2009, a
consensus had arisen in Scotland that the current intestacy provisions relating to unmarried committed partners should be repealed and re-

created and controlled by the other spouse than are extended to a spouse who remains
married until the death of his or her spouse.”).
189. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights
Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 IOWA L. REV. 223, 230 (1991) (noting that
the “predominant consideration” grounding an intestacy statute is the decedent’s intent).
190. Interpretation Act 1999, s 29A(3)(a) (N.Z.). But see Atkin, supra note 186, at
802–04 (remarking with respect to a substantially similar 2005 New Zealand statutory provision that “it is still anomalous to have two distinct tests for what is essentially the same
question: were the parties living together in a de facto relationship?” and concluding that
“[s]urely it would be better to have one definition for qualifying relationships”).
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placed.191 The Scottish Law Commission packaged its 2009 intestacy
reform proposal with a forced share reform proposal that would have, for
the first time, extended application of the forced share beyond personal
property to include real property as well.192 Powerful farming interests
opposed such an extension of the forced share.193 Thus, opposition to a
certain forced share reform complicated and arguably defeated intestacy
law reform, at least temporarily.194
Because of its simplicity of design and inherent compatibility with an
adopting jurisdiction’s marital property law, the proposed adaptor feature
should mitigate this potential drawback of comprehensive reform. The
adaptor simply works with a jurisdiction’s existing components of marital
property law, most of which are the products of a successful legislative
process. Thus, one might reasonably suspect that having comprehensive
nonmarital property law reform piggyback on existing marital property
law structures should lessen political opposition to such reform.
2. The Accrual Feature
This Part’s discussion so far has assumed an adaptor with a single fixed
value. My proposed adaptor, however, would not utilize a single fixed
value. Rather, I propose an adaptor that incorporates an accrual schedule
feature that would critically influence the calculation of any nonmarital
property award. This accrual schedule would set forth a series of increasing adaptor values matched with a corresponding series of increasing cohabitation duration periods.
For example, the adaptor value might initially be set at 0% for any
cohabitation that lasted less than five years. As noted above, cohabitation
is often a trial period for the nonmarital partners before the cohabitation
ends in either marriage of the partners or breakup of the relationship.195
Having a significant durational prerequisite period before a cohabitant
might assert a nonmarital property right would avoid capturing these trial
cohabitants within the nonmarital property rights net.
191. See SCOTTISH L. COMM’N, supra note 158, at 68 (noting that “[t]here is no doubt
that there is genuine concern about [the intestacy provisions relating to nonmarital cohabitants]” and that “[a]lmost all our consultees expressed reservations about the current
provisions”).
192. Id. app. A, at 155–60.
193. See Barney Thompson, Scottish Landowners Resist Inheritance Reform, FIN. TIMES
(Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/cf3e3a38-7f01-11e4-a828-00144feabdc0 [https://
perma.cc/UXG6-5AJV] (discussing the concern of some Scottish landowners that proposed succession law reforms would result in the splitting of large estates of land to the
extent that such estates would no longer be viable as businesses).
194. See Scottish Government Response to the Consultation on the Law of Succession,
UK WEB ARCHIVE ¶¶ 38–40 (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/
archive/20181226070023/https://www2.gov.scot/Topics/Justice/law/damages/succession/scottish-government-response-succession-consultation [https://perma.cc/A4M5-74TV] (discussing concerns that proposed forced share reform that would remove the distinction between
moveable (personal) property and heritable (real) property might compromise the viability
of certain agricultural/land based businesses and stating the Scottish Government’s position that “we do not intend to bring forward reforms in this area”).
195. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
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The adaptor value might then be reset to 25% for any cohabitation that
lasted at least five years but less than six years, and might thereafter increase 5% for each increase of one year in the cohabitation duration,
before topping out at 75% for any cohabitation period of fifteen years or
more. The accrual schedule feature ensures that, all else being equal, the
partner of a longer cohabitation generally would receive a greater
nonmarital property award than would the partner of a shorter cohabitation, reflecting the state’s greater confidence in the commitment of
nonmarital partners in a relatively longer cohabiting relationship. Topping out the accrual schedule at a significant discount off of the full marital property right would operationalize the state’s preference for
marriage over nonmarital cohabitation.
The accrual feature of my proposal seeks to address concerns arising
from the uncertainty about the extent to which any given nonmarital
couple performs the caregiving functions that the state should seek to
encourage families to perform. The feature is grounded on the assumption that relatively long-term cohabitants are more likely to exhibit these
functions than are relatively short-term cohabitants.196 Thus, under my
proposal, nonmarital property rights increase as the duration of the cohabitation increases.197
My accrual approach finds support in the iterative theory of family
property rights set forth by Professors Elizabeth Scott and Robert
Scott.198 The Scotts’ model proceeds from the broad public consensus
that the state should grant a special legal status to a family structure only
to the extent that the structure satisfies certain dependency needs, such as
providing for the physical and emotional necessities of family members.199 The state investment in such families through the provision of
services, financial subsidies, and legal rights pays dividends when family
members meet dependency needs that the state otherwise would have to
expend resources to address.200
Outside parties may have great difficulty, however, discerning whether
a novel family form is meeting its members’ dependency needs, especially
196. Scott & Scott, supra note 56, at 317 (“Commitment is usually tentative when relationships are new, and it grows over time unless or until one or both of the parties realizes
that the relationship is unsuccessful.”); Spitko, supra note 35, at 296–99 (proposing an accrual approach to intestate inheritance rights for unmarried committed partners grounded
in the assumption that a surviving partner’s financial contributions, acts of care, and reliance interests with respect to the decedent partner are likely to correlate positively with
the duration of their cohabiting partnership).
197. Cf. PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAM. DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 4.12, 5.04, 6.06 (AM. L. INST. 2002) (providing for marital and nonmarital remedies that depend upon the duration of the marital and nonmarital relationship,
respectively, to determine both eligibility for an award and the size of an award);
Blumberg, supra note 36, at 1299 (commenting that “the duration of cohabitation is likely
to be the main determinant of [domestic-partner] property claims” under the ALI
Principles).
198. See generally Scott & Scott, supra note 56.
199. Id. at 296 n.3, 304–05.
200. Id. at 304–05, 313–15.
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in the absence of any express public promises of commitment from the
members.201 Scott and Scott argue that the state is unlikely to extend full
legal recognition to a novel family form unless the novel group is able to
overcome this “verifiability” problem.202 The Scotts further suggest that
confidence in the functioning of a novel family form to meet dependency
needs can be built incrementally through an iterative process “in which
the legal rights and responsibilities are assigned incrementally, allowing
the state to monitor family functioning over time in the process of certifying family status.”203
Applying their model to unmarried cohabitants, Scott and Scott hypothesize that cohabitants as a family form have failed to achieve widespread state recognition because of the great variability among
cohabitants with respect to their commitment to meeting dependency
needs.204 Moreover, they argue, “the state has not found an effective
means of distinguishing those cohabiting partners who are committed to
assuming long-term family obligations from others who are not.”205 My
accrual feature addresses this variability/verifiability problem.
Indeed, my accrual feature reflects the state’s trust that builds over
time in the commitment of a nonmarital couple to meeting the family’s
dependency needs. The feature assigns rights and responsibilities incrementally as the cohabiting couple continues to function as a family unit.
Thus, the accrual method seeks to distinguish between those nonmarital
partners who are committed to assuming long-term family obligations
and those who are not by considering the extent to which the nonmarital
partners have actually demonstrated a commitment to one another over a
lengthy period of time.
Finally, the accrual method also is designed to lower the stakes in cases
of short-term cohabitations where generally it is less likely to be certain
that the cohabitants should qualify as committed partners for the purposes of the nonmarital property law reform. The relatively smaller
nonmarital property award that the accrual feature produces in a cohabitation of relatively shorter duration reduces the incentive of the cohabitants to litigate the nonmarital property award issue in what are more
likely to be borderline cases.206 Further, the accrual feature reduces the
cost of a court making a “wrong” qualification decision in such borderline
cases given the relatively smaller resulting nonmarital property award.207
201. Id. at 320–21.
202. Id. at 338.
203. Id. at 339.
204. Id. at 374 (“[T]he lack of substantial movement toward granting legal benefits to
unmarried cohabitants is evidence that the state remains committed to a welfarist criterion
for granting legal status, one that embodies a commitment to family-functioning norms; as
a category, cohabitants are too diverse to satisfy this criterion.”).
205. Id. at 300.
206. Spitko, supra note 35, at 300.
207. Id. at 300–01.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Article proposes an integrated “accrual adaptor” to structure
nonmarital property rights at dissolution and at death. The adaptor would
be applied to a jurisdiction’s existing marital property law to translate a
marital property right into a nonmarital property right. Thus, the proposal would not require an adopting jurisdiction to create any novel property law structures for the nonmarital context and would be fully
compatible with the substantive principles and process norms that ground
the adopting jurisdiction’s existing marital property law doctrines.
The accrual feature of this Article’s proposal would work to increase
nonmarital property rights as the duration of the cohabitation at issue
increases. This feature is premised on the notion that unmarried committed partners who have cohabited for a relatively longer period of time are
more likely to have made commitments and engaged in caretaking behaviors that nonmarital property law reform should encourage. Thus, the relatively greater nonmarital property award that the proposal would assign
to a cohabitation of relatively greater duration reflects the increasing
trust that third parties develop in the propensity of the cohabitation to
meet the couple’s dependency needs as the relationship endures.
The proposed reform would provide nonmarital partners with lesser
property rights as contrasted with marital partners in similar circumstances. This differential treatment is likely to make nonmarital property
law reform more politically feasible in the short term. Moreover, such
differential treatment can be justified in light of the greater commitment
to mutual caregiving that marriage signifies in comparison to nonmarital
cohabitation.

